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Abstract
The rising trends both in drug addiction and crime rates are of major
public concern in Germany. Surprisingly, the economic theory of crime
seems to ignore the drugs–crime nexus, whereas the criminological lit-
erature considers illicit drug use a main reason of criminal activities.
This paper provides an econometric assessment of the drugs–crime
channel within a Becker–Ehrlich model of crime supply. Estimation
with panel data from the German states allows us to take into account
further factors that might influence both drug abuse and crime. The
results indicate that drug offences have a significant impact, in particu-
lar on property crimes. We attribute this to a strong economic–related
channel of drug abuse on crime.
1 Introduction
The rising trends both in drug addiction and crime rates are of major public
concern in Germany. In particular, in East Germany the use of narcotics
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was not widespread prior to unification, but a rapid catch up process has to
be observed in this area.1 Public concern about narcotics and crime covers
both moral and economic aspects. The analysis mainly concentrates on the
costs of drug addiction and related crimes which include expenditures of the
public health system for drug addicts, negative productivity effects of drug
use, tax evasion of black market activities, costs of prosecution among others.
Furthermore, drug abuse may contribute to an increase in overall crime rates.
In fact, the evidence of a strong connection between illicid drug use and a
wide range of criminal activities seems to be overwhelming. For instance,
Beck et al. (1993) report that 49% of U.S. State Prison Inmates commit-
ted their offence under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and 17% indicated
committing their offence to get money to buy drugs. Harrison and Gfroerer
(1992) found that 26.1% of persons booked for any violent crime, and 24.7% of
persons booked for any property crime used alcohol, cannabis and cocaine. A
recent research study of the British Home Office analysed the results of urine
tests carried out on 839 people arrested in five areas of England (London,
Cambridge, Manchester, Nottingham and Sunderland). The outcome was
that nearly two thirds tested positive for at least one illegal drug. Moreover,
the Home Office estimates that one third of acquisitive crime is drug–related
(see NACRO, 1999). German official crime statistics reveal that among the
total number of offences cleared by the police 7.5% were under the influence
of illegal drugs and 7.6% were under the influence of alcohol in 1999 (Bun-
deskriminalamt, 2000). For robbery, the shares were 14.8% and 14.0%, and
for homicides 6.4% and 27.1%, respectively.
Following Goldstein (1985) and Goldstein, Brownstein and Ryan (1992),
criminologists provide three different explanations of drug–related crime (see
also Corman and Mocan, 2000). First, system–related crimes include those
that are related to the system of drug production and drug trafficking, in
particular concomitant crimes such as corruption, intimidation, extortion
and crimes of violence. Competition for drug markets and customers cause
disputes and rip–offs among individuals involved in the illegal drug–market,
murders as means of enforcing systemic codes, killing of informants, injury or
death resulting from disputes over drug possession, territory, etc. (Goldstein,
Brownstein and Ryan, 1992). On the one hand, these crimes originate from
interdicting the production and traffic of drugs and on the other hand from
1Some stylized facts are provided in section 2.
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the high rents, which can be obtained by violating the law. Concomitant
crimes raise market entry barriers for potential concurrent suppliers in order
to protect monopolistic rents from drug traffic.
Second, economic–related crimes are committed as a result of the drug users’
compulsion to obtain drugs (Goldstein, Brownstein and Ryan, 1992). Seen
from an economist’s viewpoint, economic–related crimes are more related to
the demand side of the illegal drug market, whereas systemic effects can be
attributed to the supply side. The high costs of narcotics2 combined with
a possibly low price elasticity resulting from addiction require high income.
If the drug addicts can afford their consumption out of current income or
wealth, an increase of criminal offences is not to be expected from the de-
mand side. However, a large fraction of drug addicts are younger people
without finished education and other groups of the population with low in-
come from legal activities. These addicts might finance their consumption
through prostitution or illegal activities like theft and robbery.
Finally, victim/offender use–related crimes include those that are consequen-
tial to the consumption of drugs by the victim or offender, since the ingestion
of a drug may cause irrational or violent behaviour. This effect of drug abuse
is also called the pharmacological effect.
The major part of the empirical evidence in the literature on drug–related
crime is based on correlative evidence between drug addiction or drug offences
and criminal activity. However, third factors might be responsible for both
drug consuming and crime, e.g. poverty and unemployment may be claimed
to be the true underlying causes of both use of narcotics and acquisitive
crime. In a rare exception to the criminological literature, Otero–Lopez et
al. (1994) have found support of this view. Based on a survey of over two
thousand male students between 14 and 18 years of age, the authors claimed
support for the notion that peer, family, and individual factors were more
predictive of both risk behaviours than either risk behaviour was on the other.
Economists who follow the general approach of “The Economics of Crime”
(Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973) for testing the deterrence hypothesis are used
to control for “third factors”. Changing economic incentives can influence
2Despite a falling trend in prices since the mid eighties due to increased supply, the price
per gram of cocaine or heroine is still of the order of magnitude of 50 (Landeskriminalamt
Baden–Wu¨rttemberg 2001, p. 55).
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crimes as was shown in numerous articles. Recent important examples focus
on the impact of unemployment (Raphael and Winter–Ebmer 2001) or show
that the introduction of minimum wages has led to a fall in crime rates in
the U.K. (Hansen and Machin 2001). However, economists usually ignore the
importance of illicit drug use in economic crime studies. Corman and Mo-
can (2000) and Kuziemko and Levitt (2001) provide remarkable exceptions.
Based on monthly time series from New York City Corman and Mocan (2000)
compare the relative magnitudes of the effects of local law enforcement activ-
ities on crime with the magnitude of variations in drug use on crime. They
find that law enforcement effects on crime are stronger and more significant
than drug usage, which only has a small effect on property crimes. Kuziemko
and Levitt (2001) analyse the effect of imprisoning drug offenders and find
that the reduction in violent and property crime associated with adding one
additional drug prisoner was almost as great as the reduction in crime when
a violent or property offender was sentenced to prison.
The purpose of this study is to provide an econometric assessment of the
economics–of–crime model with a special focus on the impact of illicit drugs
on crime. Unlike Corman and Mocan (2000), who were restricted to consider
deterrence, poverty and drug usage as explanatory variables in their high–
frequency data set coming from a big metropolis, we take a broader view
to the crime problem, inspired by recent social and economic problems like
unemployment, migration, inequality, and demographic changes in Europe.
The focus of our contribution has changed from the traditional testing of the
deterrence hypothesis to the analysis of socio–economic, drug–driven and
demographic factors.
Evidence from a panel of the German Laender (the German “states”) allows
us to exploit the very heterogeneous experiences in densely populated urban
areas such as Berlin and Hamburg (which are also states, so–called “Stadt-
staaten”, i.e. “city–states”) and sparsely populated areas such as Lower Sax-
ony. Some considerable heterogeneity is also given due to the German federal
system, according to which state governments are responsible for their police
and the fight against crime within the borders of the corresponding Laender.
This gives us the interesting opportunity to test the performance of con-
servatively ruled governments against the performance of social democrats
and other coalitions. Moreover, our disaggregate German data set allows
to look at differences between West and East Germany, where a very quick
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convergence towards the western drug addiction rates seems to take place,
and where recent general crime rates were even exceeding West German fig-
ures. However, given the short time span of data for East Germany, our
econometric analysis is restricted to West Germany.
Our results indicate that ignoring the effect of drug use in empirical models
of the economics of crime would lead to an omitted variable bias. Drug
offences have a relatively strong effect on property crimes and and on rape.
The deterrence hypothesis of the economics of crime model is confirmed for
property crimes, whereas no convincing evidence has been found for violent
crime.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
general tendencies of drug abuse and crime rates and provides stylized facts
on the direct crime–drugs nexus and potential third factors. The economic
modelling framework and the choice of relevant variables are introduced in
section 3, section 4 describes the data sources and provides some descriptive
statistics while section 5 covers econometric considerations. The estimation
results are summarized in section 6. They allow for conclusions on the extent
to which illegal drug use contributes to the development of overall crime rates.
In section 7, we present results of our sensitivity analysis of the estimates.
The findings are linked to the public issue of drug related crimes in section 8.
2 Crime, drug offences and potential third
factors of crime
2.1 General tendencies
Due to the illegal nature of drug abuse and drug related crimes, it is difficult
to obtain reliable data on the extent of these phenomena. Corman and Mocan
(2000) use the number of deaths which are due to drug poisoning as a proxy
for drug use. Figure 1 shows these numbers for Germany3 in the lower panel,
while the upper panel depicts the number of first time users of drugs, which
3The data are for West Germany until 1990, for West Germany and Berlin in 1991 and
for Germany since 1992.
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became noticed by the police.
Figure 1: First time users and deaths due to drug posisoning
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000); own calculations.
The number of deaths due to drug use are not a very close proxy for the
development of drug use for several reasons. First, there exists a time lag
between drug use and death caused by drug abuse, since a large fraction
of these deaths is caused by physical decay due to persisting drug abuse.4
Second, the number of deaths is influenced by changing concentration of
narcotics within the drugs supplied (Bundeskriminalamt 2000). Furthermore,
drug–addicted may move from rural areas to cities during their “drug career”.
Then, the use of death rates may overstate drug abuse in the German city
states compared to the other states. Consequently, estimates based on a
panel of German states might be biased using this proxy. Using the number
of first time users is not a satisfying proxy either. First, the numbers depend
on the awareness of the police officers who get into contact with the drug
4For example, no relevant number of deaths which are due to drug poisoning are yet
reported for East Germany in 1999. In contrast, the number of reported first time drug
users, increased by 23.4% in East Germany from 1998 to 1999, while a slight decrease of
1.8% in West Germany for the same time period corresponds to an increase in the number
of deaths by 8.2%.
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user. Thus, these numbers might be biased downward for areas where drug
abuse is less common. Second, these numbers measure flows into the pool of
drug users. Since no estimates of the outflow are available, it seems difficult
to obtain a proxy of the stock of drug addicts which is more relevant for our
analysis of the drug–crime nexus.
Given the limits of these proxies for drug abuse, the numbers on direct drug
offences reported by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskrim-
inalamt) appear to be a more sensible proxy for the overall development of
drug abuse. These numbers include reported cases of illegal drug trafficking,
possession and consumption of drugs, but do not include procuring crimes
like theft from pharmacies. While this measure shares the drawback to de-
pend on the effort of the police spent on persecuting these crimes, it appears
to be the most suitable proxy for monitoring the impact of drug abuse on
overall crime rates.
The relevance of an analysis of drug abuse and its impact on overall crime
rates is substantiated by the increase of drug abuse as measured by these
numbers from the German Federal Criminal Office. Figure 2 and Table 1
show the development of overall crime rates and offences against drug related
laws.
The upper panel of Figure 2 plots the development of overall crime rates in
West and East Germany. While West German data exhibit no clear ten-
dency during the 1990s, East German crime rates start at a higher level
in 1993 and slowly adjust downwards. The development of drug offences
shown in the lower panel shows a rising trend for West Germany and a fast
adjustment of East German rates. From the early seventies to the end of
the nineties, the numbers increase from less than 50 to almost 300 cases per
100 000 inhabitants for West Germany. However, the increase is not uniform.
In recessionary periods like the early eighties and again in 1992/93, the num-
bers remain almost constant. In East Germany after unification almost no
offences against drug related laws are reported. Reliable numbers are avail-
able only from 1993 on. They show a tremendous increase over the six year
period to 1999, when East German figures amounted already to more than
50% of West German figures.
Like all crime related data, these numbers have to be interpreted with some
care since an increase might result from a real increase in offences, a stiffening
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Figure 2: Crime rates and drug offences (cases per 100 000 inhabitants)
Crime rates
Drug offences
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000); own calculations.
of relevant laws, or an increase of the share of known cases among all cases.
However, a stiffening of relevant laws cannot be observed during the 1990s.
Thus, although underreporting might have been more pronounced in East
Germany immediately after unification, the sharp increase in cases from 1993
to 1999 indicates that the overall trend might be mainly determined by an
increase in offences.
In Table 1, a disaggregation is undertaken with regard to the characteristics
of the federal states. The first two entries show that the rate of offences is
much higher in the city states, which might correspond to a supply side effect
on the one side and higher income opportunities on the other. The numbers
for the federal states in West Germany with highest and lowest case numbers
exhibit some dispersion, which, at least partially, might be attributed to the
higher share of urban population in Nordrhein–Westfalen as compared to the
rather rural state Schleswig–Holstein. Finally, the last two entries show the
enormous increase in cases for the East German federal states with highest
(Brandenburg) and lowest (Sachsen) case numbers in 1993.
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Table 1: Drug offences (cases per 100 000 inhabitants)
federal state 1993 1999 Change
Federal state corresponding to cities
Hamburg 437 771 76%
Bremen 450 590 31%
Other federal states, West Germany
Max.: Nordrhein–Westf. 213 321 51%
Min.: Schleswig–Holstein 85 243 186%
Other federal states, East Germany
Max.: Brandenburg 11 184 1573%
Min.: Sachsen 6 142 2267%
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1994, 2000); own calculations.
The statistics of the German Federal Criminal Police Office also provides
some further information on the link between (illegal) drug use and other
crime categories. Unfortunately, these data are not very comprehensive and
do not allow for a causal interpretation. Nevertheless, they may provide
some further stylized facts. For example, Bundeskriminalamt (1998), p. 68,
indicates that in 1997 14% of robbery cases, which have been solved, were
committed by drug addicts. For robbery of shops and handbags this rate
increases to 26% and 25%, respectively. Furthermore, shop–lifting under
aggravating circumstances was committed in 33% of solved cases by drug
addicts. However, a large share of unsolved cases makes it difficult to draw
inferences from these findings. Comparable figures for crimes of violence are
not provided for drug addicts, but Bundeskriminalamt (1998), p. 69, reports
that 60% of violent bill dodging and 41% of solved cases of manslaughter were
committed under influence of alcohol. Consequently, at least the pharmaco-
logical effect of drug abuse might have an even stronger impact on overall
crime rates, in particular for crimes of violence, when legal drugs like alcohol
are also taken into consideration.
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2.2 General crime trends and the direct crime–drugs
nexus
Obviously, the reported figures on drug offences do not cover all crimes, which
might be related to drug–addiction and the market for illegal drugs. Neither
do they include direct procurement crimes such as theft from pharmacies5 nor
further economic or system–related crimes. In order to obtain a first hint on
a potential direct crime–drugs nexus, Figure 3 plots the development of drug
offences in the upper panel against the developments of crimes of violence
and property crimes in the lower panel. All data are for West Germany and
indexed to the base year 1975.
Figure 3: Trends in crime rates (West Germany)
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000); own calculations.
The crime rates of all considered crime categories exhibit a positive trend.
However, the trend in drug offences is much more pronounced than in the
other crime categories. The correlation between drug offences and the other
5Surprisingly, the statistics indicate, that only about 60% of these directly drug re-
lated crimes are committed by drug–addicted. In Bundeskriminalamt (1998), p. 68, this
observation is explained by a non complete assessment of drug–addiction among criminals.
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two crime categories is substantial. In fact, the correlation with crimes of
violence amounts to 0.80, and the correlation with property crimes to 0.61.6
However, given that the trends in all crime categories might be determined
by further (common) factors, it is not appropriate to draw far reaching causal
conclusion from these findings. In particular, it is not adequate to deduce a
stronger effect on system–related crimes, which are more likely to be crimes of
violence, relative to the effect on economic–related crimes, which fall into the
category of property crimes. An assessment of the impact of drug offences on
overall crime rates requires a comprehensive model which controls for third
factors.
To a certain extent, higher crime rates might be the result of a more intensive
work of the police itself. This surprising conclusion might be drawn from
Figure 4, which shows growth rates of expenditures on police per capita and
(total) crime rates in Western Germany. The high positive correlation of 0.47
7 indicates that a better financial endowment enables the police to light up
the share of “dark figures” of official crime statistics, since more criminal acts
can be processed and registered. As the share of unreported crimes renders
official crime statistics suspect as a basis upon researchers wish to make
inferences, we need to consider this helpful information in our econometric
model (see Section 3).
2.3 Potential third factors
Third factors, which might influence the crime–drugs nexus, are all those,
which determine drug consumption, overall crime rates or both. Conse-
quently, all the socio–economic variables, found to be important in the econo-
metric modelling of crime rates, have to be considered, e.g. measures of in-
come and income distribution (GDP, unemployment, share of young men), a
distinction between rural areas and cities, or political factors such as ruling
party or coalition. Since these factors might also be linked to drug consump-
6The highest correlation of drug offences with a more disaggregated set of crime cate-
gories is found with theft. It amounts to 0.93.
7As can be seen from the calculation of cross–correlation coefficients, police expendi-
tures are rather leading than lagging with respect to crime rates: The coefficient is 0.46
if it is estimated using a one–year lag of crime, and it is −0.10 if crime would lead by one
year.
11
















75 80 85 90 95
Police expenditures per capita
Crime rate
Expend. Crime rate
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000), O¨ffentliche Finanzen, (various years); own cal-
culations.
tion, Table 2 shows some correlations between the number of drug offences
per inhabitant and these factors.
Again, the bivariate correlations do not allow for a causal interpretation. For
example, the positive correlation between a conservative government and the
number of drug offences at the federal level might be due solely to the fact
that a conservative government was in place for the whole period 1981 – 1997,
i.e. during the period with highest increase in the number of drug offences.
Nevertheless, the results indicate the potential importance of neglecting third
factors, which exhibit some statistical correlation both with drug offences and
overall crime rates.
Our estimation will include dummies for each year and each of the German
Laender in order to control for further factors, e.g. the development of prices
on the market for illegal drugs.8
8Unfortunately, the price data are not yet available on a Laender base.
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Table 2: Drug offences and third factors
Correlation Cross section of Time series
between West German for West Germany




young men -0.50 -0.76
GDP (1991 = 100)
per capita 0.83 0.93
City states 0.89 —
Ruling party
is conservative -0.47 0.68
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1994, 2000); own calculations.
3 Economic modelling and choice of Specifi-
cation
As is well known, the standard theoretical framework of “The Economics of
Crime” is based on Becker’s (1968) seminal article. Becker’s theory of de-
terrence is an application of the general theory of rational behaviour under
uncertainty. Optimising individuals engage in criminal activities when ex-
pected payoffs of the criminal activity exceed the costs of criminal activity,
mainly given by the probability and severity of sanctions. Ehrlich (1973)
extended Becker’s model by considering a time allocation model. Since time
can be allocated to legal and illegal activities, besides deterrence “third”
variables of legal and illegal income opportunities start to play a central role
in empirical tests of the Becker–Ehrlich model, approximated by abilities,
family income, human capital, and other socio–economic variables.
These considerations have led to the basic Becker–Ehrlich specification of
the so-called “supply of offences” (see Grogger 1991, Ehrlich 1996, Levitt
1996, Corman and Mocan 2000, and Entorf and Spengler 2000, for recent
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applications). It is commonly written in logarithmic form:
lnO = α + β lnD + γ lnY + δ lnX (1)
where O is the crime rate (number of offences per 100,000 inhabitants), D
is deterrence, Y is income opportunity and X represents “other influences”,
with the latter becoming increasing influence in the recent literature.
In order to cover the whole spectrum of the potential drugs–crime nexus,
we analyse the explanatory power of drug offences for murder, rape, assault,
i.e. violent crimes that might be motivated as system–related crimes or as
the result of pharmacological factors, and for robbery and theft (with and
without aggravating circumstances), i.e. property crimes that are possibly
drug–driven in the sense of economic–related crimes.9
In most studies, the effect of deterrence variables (clear–up or conviction
rates, length of arrest, fines) are found to be more or less negative, i.e. in line
with predictions from theory (see, for instance, Eide, 1994, for a survey). In
our specification, as in most applications of the Becker–Ehrlich model, we
measure deterrence by clear–up rates. We refrain from testing deterrence by
use of an indicator of the severity of punishment, because the identification
of state–specific law interpretations is difficult to obtain and is left to future
research.
Legal income opportunities are represented by the unemployment rate (UR),
i.e. the probability to find a legal job. Furthermore, we include a relative
income measure defined as GDP R = (yit − yt)/yt, where yit and yt are state
specific GDP per capita and West German10 GDP per capita, respectively.11
The expected sign of this variable is not clear. Persons who choose between
legal and illegal income opportunities, and who are looking for a legal job
9The exact econometric identification of system–related crimes, economic–related
crimes and of pharmacological effects is not subject of this paper. Tackling this aim
would require information on prices of illicit drugs, which however, are not available for
Germany at disaggregate levels over a long period of time. In our paper we try to find
out whether there is any — perhaps confounded — influence stemming from illicit drugs
in economics of crime models.
10We restrict our analysis to West German data, see below.
11Many econometric applications use (absolute) GDP as indicator of illegal (but also
legal) income opportunities. Pretests, however, have shown that including relative GDP
as defined above renders absolute GDP insignificant. Moreover, both variables show a
high degree of covariation, such that we only present results based on relative income.
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and/or certain reservation wage levels, would be more successful in prosper-
ing regions, suggesting that better legal income opportunities would lead to
a negative sign. On the other hand, states that do better than the aver-
age provide lucrative targets and attract potential criminals who, moreover,
might leave degrading regions. Such “crime migration” would result in a
crime enhancing effect, i.e. a positive sign.
Unemployment rates measure absence of legal income opportunities, and are
integral part of most empirical models of the Becker–Ehrlich type, although
the expected positive sign cannot be observed in many econometric studies
(Chiricos 1987, surveying 68 studies, shows that fewer than half find positive
significant effects). Raphael and Winter–Ebmer (2001) argue that the failure
to control for variables that exert pro–cyclical pressure may downwardly-bias
estimates of the unemployment–crime effect. Given our measure of relative
income, in line with Raphael and Winter–Ebmer (2001), Cook and Zarkin
(1985) and related literature, we are able to adjust for any omitted variable
bias of this kind.
Demographic factors are strongly correlated with crime, at least in a bivari-
ate framework. For instance, of 100 suspects in 1999, more than 75 are male,
and more than 40 are younger than 25 years. Young men aged 15–24 years
are suspected to have committed 27% of all registered crimes, whereas the
population share of this group is only 6% (Bundeskriminalamt, 2000). These
facts have led us to consider the share of young men under 25 years of age
in the crime–supply equation. Moreover, a high percentage of crimes in Ger-
many is committed by foreigners. In 1999, more than 25% of all suspects
were foreigners, whereas the population share is about 9% (Bundeskrimi-
nalamt, 2000). It should be noted, however, that there are many reasons
why foreigners are over–represented in the group of suspects.12 However,
in order to avoid potential omitted–variable biases, we have included the
12First, they may be more often wrongly suspected than the native population. Second,
there are some laws – like the foreigner and asylum laws – which can, by definition, only
be broken by foreigners. Third, foreigners who reside in Europe are to a higher percentage
young men. Fourth, some foreigners may be in European countries after fleeing their
homeland, because they were offenders there. Finally, most foreigners enter European
countries, because they had no economic success in their home country. The latter may
be due to factors that foster crime, for example, lack of education. These points should
be kept in mind when judging the coefficients of the foreigner variable in our empirical
results.
15
share of foreigners as a further demographic factor in our set of explanatory
variables.
As demonstrated in Section 2 of our paper, expenditures on German police
are positively correlated with registered crime, most probably because ad-
ditional financial means could be used by the police to reduce the share of
unreported crimes. Thus, since the dependent variable is registered crime,
available from official police statistics, and not (unobservable) actual crime, it
is important to control for such “crime producing” factors in order to achieve
crime rates adjusted for distortions arising as a consequence of varying gov-
ernment expenditures.
Finally, the description of our data seems to suggest that conservative gov-
ernments are more successful in fighting or preventing crimes. In addition to
correlative evidence presented in Section 2, it might be interesting to note
that in our sample (1976 – 1995) conservative party participation in state
governments is associated with crime rates being 33.7% lower in conserva-
tively governed states and government periods. Of course, there are other
ways of interpretation. For instance, voters of Christian–democrat parties
may be more law–abiding than voters of other parties. Another explanation
may be that conservative parties are more successful in rural or wealthy re-
gions, whereas crime is an urban phenomenon, located in cities with social
problems like unemployment and illicit drug use, rendering bivariate corre-
lation coefficients potentially spurious. To judge suppositions of this kind
would require the consideration of the conservative government effect in a
multivariate context. In our framework, we use a dummy variable indicating
whether conservative parties (CDU or CSU) belong to the ruling coalition of
the respective state at time t.
4 Data
The data consist of a balanced West German panel containing annual data
from all 11 states (Laender) that formed the Federal Republic of Germany
prior to the German unification in 1990. Berlin, which contained a West and
East German part, is treated as a West German state in our empirical anal-
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ysis.13 Since during the years following the unification there were difficulties
in the registration of crimes and clear–ups in the five new states (Branden-
burg, Mecklenburg–Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony–Anhalt, Thuringia), we
include time–region dummy variables for Berlin during the years 1990 to
1992.14 In order to rely on relatively long time series, and since drug related
crimes would need a different approach in East Germany, we refrained from
including data from the five East German states.
Table 3 describes all variables used in our estimations. Crime and clear–up
rates are taken from the German Federal Criminal Police Office. We use the
rate of drug related crimes per inhabitant for the German Laender. This vari-
able comprises illegal drug consumption and trade with narcotics, but does
not include drug related crimes, such as theft of drugs from pharmacies or
theft in order to obtain money for drug consumption. Therefore, our proxy
variable does not simply coincide with “economic–related crimes” of drug
offenders in the sense of Goldstein (1985). The variables FOREIGN (percent-
age of foreigners in the population), GDP H (real Gross Domestic Product per
capita in constant prices), GDP R (relation of states’ GDP to federal GDP),
M15-24 (percentage of males aged 15–24 in the population), and CONSERV
(ruling party is conservative) are calculated on the basis of data from the
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt). The vari-
able UR (unemployment rate) is taken from annual reports of the Federal Em-
ployment Service (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit). Data on police expenditures
can be found in statistics on public finance (O¨ffentliche Finanzstatistiken)
published by Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
13This can be justified by the fact that former West–Berlin is about 65% larger in
population and 150% larger in GDP than East–Berlin. Because of the fast adjustment of
East–Berlin’s living conditions to West German standards the united city may be more
appropriately considered West German than East German.
14According to notes provided in our data source (Bundeskriminalamt (1996)) East
German police statistics of the years 1990 to 1992 are biased downwards due to admin-
istrative adjustment problems. Thus, 1993 is the first year after unification which allows
for a reasonable comparison between East and West German crime figures.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of pooled data
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
O1 - O5 = Crime rates calculated as number of
crimes known to the police per 100,000 in-
habitants
O1 = Murder and manslaughter 5.22 2.21
O2 = Serious assault 128.32 65.89
O3 = Vandalism 725.96 270.76
O4 = Robbery 74.04 68.47
O5 = Theft (with and without aggravating cir-
cumstances)
5236.76 2635.17
P = Percentage of crimes cleared up by the po-
lice
45.73 6.15
P1 - P5 = crime specific clear–up ratios 24.0 – 93.4 -
(see O1 - O5)
DRUGS = Number of drug offences per 100,000 in-
habitants
154.70 113.11
FOREIGN = Percentage of foreign citizens in the pop-
ulation
7.93 3.22
GDP H = Real gross domestic product per capita in
prices from 1991
37679.26 9750.14
GDP R = (GDP per capita - West German GDP per
capita)/(West German GDP per capita)
0.06 0.25
UR = Unemployment rate 7.93 3.22
M15-24 = Percentage of males aged 15–24 in the
population
7.36 1.07
POL/GDP = Police expenditures /GDP 0.0066 0.0058
CONSERV = Dummy variable that takes the value 1
if the state is ruled by a Christian party
(CDU or CSU), or if a Christian party





Empirical investigations on the causes of crime suffer from the fact that a
substantial share of crimes is not registered by the police. This shortcoming is
particularly severe for cross–sectional analysis. In contrast to cross–sectional
studies, fixed–effect modelling allows us to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity within the used panel data of the German states. Since the share
of reported crimes might differ between states, the inclusion of state dummy
variables considers unobserved heterogeneity stemming from this potential
source of bias. It should be noted, however, that this conclusion requires the
assumption of a time invariant structure of unreported crimes between states.
Experience with similar data (Entorf 1996, Entorf and Spengler 2000) has
shown that the inclusion of state effects also covers the explanatory power
of population density. It is excluded from the set of explanatory variables
because it is dominated by fixed–effects which, of course, does not rule out
that urban factors do play a crucial role for the heterogeneity of crime within
Germany.
As regards institutional changes as, for instance, changes of the federal law,
or other unobserved heterogeneity that applies to all cross–sectional units
simultaneously, we include time–specific constants, i.e. we apply two–way
fixed effect models. Statistical inference in applied fixed–effects panel econo-
metrics is often based on (asymptotic) standard errors of the ordinary least
squares estimator without consideration of any potential serial correlation of
estimated residuals which would render standard t–values and F–statistics of
only descriptive use. We inform about potential serial correlation by calculat-
ing a statistic provided by Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982),
who modified the classical Durbin–Watson statistic for the use of panel data,
which we call BFN–DW. Moreover, we corrected for serial correlation of
residuals of the crime–supply equation by considering the model
lnOit = αi + x
′
it
β + ²it (2)
²it = ρ²i.t−1 + uit, (3)
which is estimated using nonlinear regression techniques (for details, see
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1996, pp. 331–341).
The significance of deterrence seems to be well documented for the US, where
recent contributions by Corman and Mocan (2000) and in particular by Levitt
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(1996, 1997, 1998) confirm early results of, for instance, Ehrlich (1973). In
our German case study, deterrence is measured by the percentage of (regis-
tered) offences cleared by the police. Unfortunately, this variable causes some
problems because the denominator of this variable (the number of crimes)
is the dependent variable. To avoid this ratio bias, we lag the explanatory
variable by one period (see Levitt, 1998).
Drug offences as explanatory factors of crime enter estimated equations in
both instant and lagged form. Here contemporaneous values cover the di-
rect impact, i.e. the stimulating influence of illicit drugs itself,15 whereas
lagged values are able to represent indirect effects which are based on growing
poverty during a drug career which again would imply lacking legal income
opportunities.
In general, we have chosen a one–year lag for variables which are character-
ized by relatively high (cyclical) variation and by some gestation lag that
is necessary to make the impact on crime effective. These are the unem-
ployment rate, income (or poverty), police expenditures and the indicator of
conservative governments. Slowly changing demographic variables (share of
young men and of foreigners in the population, ratio of state population to
aggregate population) — which are rather characterized by their relatively
high cross–sectional variance than by their time series dimension — enter the
estimations without lag.
6 Estimation results
Panel regression results are summarised in Table 4 and Table 5. The drugs–
crime nexus is significant for all crime categories except murder and assault.
The highest impact seems to take place for rape, where the contemporaneous
coefficient is 0.19816, a result that might be at least partly explained by the
pharmacological effect of illegal narcotics. All other estimated elasticities, if
15Of course, the expected sign is positive, although some narcotics as marijuana, for
instance, seem more likely to reduce aggressive (i.e. violent) behaviour.
16The coefficient remains high also after adjusting for the potentially diminishing effect of
lagged drug offences (which have a negative, but insignificant, sign: see Table 5): Omitting
lagged drug offences results in a coefficient estimate of 0.196.
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significant, are surprisingly stable across crime categories, ranging between
0.06 and 0.11. Thus, given the moderate magnitude of these effects, suppo-
sitions about the dominating influence of drug addiction on crime need to
be put in perspective. The inclusion of third factors has shown the spurious
nature of high bivariate correlation coefficients.17
Estimated results are similar to those of Corman and Mocan (2000), who
report significant effects for burglary and robbery, but who did not detect
any significance of drug use on both murder and assault (there was no analysis
for rape). The latter outcome is somewhat surprising for the U.S., given the
high death rate among the members of a drug selling gang reported in Levitt
and Venkatesh (2000).
The economics of crime literature presumes variables of deterrence among
the most important third factors. Estimation results show the expected neg-
ative sign of the clear–up rate in four out of six cases, but only one (highly)
significant result can be observed (for theft under aggravating circumstances
(u.a.c.), coefficient estimate = −0.20). Significance is very poor for violent
crimes and for theft without aggravating circumstances (theft w.a.c.), al-
though the latter result is perhaps not surprising given the construction of
the clear–up rate for shoplifting and other delinquencies belonging to theft
w.a.c. Here clear–up rates are relatively high (52% in West Germany, 1996)
but not always informative, because often petty larcenies are reported only in
case suspects get caught and the police can be informed immediately about
the perpetrator. Since, however, also for robbery we find only a small and
insignificant coefficient of −0.060, we might conclude that — with the no-
table exception of theft u.a.c. — there is no clear evidence in favour of the
deterrence hypothesis of the economics of crime model. For instance, all
estimated coefficients remain well below the median (−0.34) obtained for a
sample of several studies surveyed by Eide (1994, p. 156).
Improvement of relative income reduces crime in all estimated equations
(though only two of them are highly significant), supporting the view that
(relative) wealth improvement leads to better legal income opportunities.
Unemployment, however, has the ambiguous result usually found in the liter-
17For instance, regressing “log (theft under aggravating circumstances)” (theft u.a.c.)
on “log (drug offences)” using pooled OLS (without any further regressor) would lead to
a highly significant regression coefficient of 0.508 (result not reported elsewhere).
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Table 4: Estimation results, property crimes
Independent Theft Theft Robbery
Variables u.a.c. w.a.c.
Deterrence
- log (clear–up rate (-1)) -0.195∗∗ -0.056 -0.060
(0.042) (0.094) (0.081)
Drugs
- log (drug offences) 0.058∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.028) (0.022) (0.037)
- log (drug offences (-1)) 0.003 0.000 0.053
(0.028) (0.022) (0.037)
Income opportunities
- log (ur(-1)) 0.225∗∗ 0.025 -0.084
(0.068) (0.055) (0.107)
- relative income (-1) -0.184 -0.103 -1.330∗∗
(0.190) (0.149) (0.328)
Demographics
- log (share of young men, 15–24) 0.307 0.947∗∗ 0.657
(0.265) (0.219) (0.645)
- log (share of foreigners) 0.342∗∗ 0.215∗ 0.611∗
(0.126) (0.102) (0.251)
Control
- conservative government (-1) 0.004 0.024 0.034
(0.019) (0.015) (0.026)
- log (police expenditures (-1)/GDP(-1)) -0.173 -0.075 -0.304
(0.168) (0.135) (0.245)
AR(1)–coefficient 0.544∗∗ 0.557∗∗ 0.832∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.047)
BFN–DW–statistics 2.10 2.18 2.33
Adjusted R–squared 0.992 0.987 0.991
All estimates include time– and region–specific constants (two–way fixed–effect
modelling), standard errors in parentheses, sample: West German states, 1976–
1996 (220 observations)
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ature. Positive (crime enhancing) significant effects of higher unemployment
can be found for theft u.a.c., whereas estimated coefficients are insignificant
for other categories. The reason for the existence of ambiguous results is often
discussed in the literature, but we suggest to keep in mind that many studies
(like ours) are dealing with regional data. Evidence using information on the
mobility and origin of offenders in the German state Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(Bu¨ttner and Spengler, 2001) reveals that criminals prefer regions with low
unemployment over regions with high unemployment, a result that also holds
for violent crimes, and that might be explained by the presence of more lu-
crative targets in advantaged regions. Thus, in exactly the same way as GDP
p.c., also unemployment rates can be interpreted in the sense of both legal
and illegal income opportunities, such that also negative signs are plausible
when offender mobility is taken into account.
The effect of demographic variables on property crimes differs from that on
violent crimes. Higher shares of young men and of foreigners lead to higher
rates of theft and robbery (all signs are positive, four out of six coefficients are
significant), whereas no significant effect can be observed for violent crimes.
Only rape seems to be affected by varying shares of young men. Here the
elasticity is relatively high (0.918), but only weakly significant (p=0.07).
Contrary to expectations based on simple correlation analysis, neither gov-
ernment participation of conservative parties nor police expenditures do
show any significant impact on (recorded) crime. Regressing police expen-
ditures/GDP on fixed time and region effects and adjusting for serial cor-
relation reveals the reason for this lacking police effect: The adjusted R–
squared of this unreported regression is 0.998, hence almost all variation can
be explained by cross sectional differences, aggregate cyclical variation of the
Federal budget and by serial correlation, all of which are controlled for in our
specification of considered crime categories.
Likewise, after controlling for third factors given by demographic movements,
unemployment, income possibilities etc., “conservative governments” do not
perform any better than non–conservative governments.
Summing up, property crimes fit the economic model of crime much bet-
ter than violent crimes, a result which is not surprising given that prop-
erty crimes are supposed to be closer to the idea of the “rational” offender,
whereas violent crimes often seem subject to irrational behaviour. The phar-
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Table 5: Estimation results, violent crimes
Independent Murder Assault Rape
Variables
Deterrence
- log (clear–up rate (-1)) 0.021 -0.086 0.069
(0.234) (0.237) (0.119)
Drugs
- log (drug offences) 0.045 0.039 0.198∗∗
(0.076) (0.031) (0.053)
- log (drug offences (-1)) 0.044 -0.035 -0.054
(0.077) (0.031) (0.053)
Income opportunities
- log (ur(-1)) 0.122 -0.097 0.107
(0.173) (0.085) (0.131)
- relative income (-1) -1.259∗∗ 0.029 -0.087
(0.473) (0.246) (0.368)
Demographics
- log (share of young men, 15–24) 0.245 -0.362 0.918
(0.633) (0.389) (0.509)
- log (share of foreigners) -0.013 -0.016 0.038
(0.300) (0.187) (0.249)
Control
- conservative government (-1) 0.051 -0.014 -0.009
(0.051) (0.021) (0.037)
- log (police expenditures (-1)/GDP(-1)) -0.844 0.081 0.282
(0.448) (0.196) (0.329)
AR(1)–coefficient 0.440∗∗ 0.721∗∗ 0.554∗∗
(0.070) (0.048) (0.068)
BFN–DW–statistics 2.21 2.05 2.18
Adjusted R–squared 0.826 0.982 0.946
All estimates include time– and region–specific constants (two–way fixed–effect
modelling), standard errors in parentheses, sample: West German states, 1976–
1996 (220 observations)
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macological effect of drugs, for instance, seems to be responsible for the high
coefficient on rape. The economics of crime model performs best for theft
u.a.c., both with respect to fitting the data and to accordance with effects
predicted by theory.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
Some additional estimation results presented in the appendix reveal the ro-
bustness of our results. They are presented in Tables 6 and 7, where we do
not consider murder and assault because of their poor performance in Ta-
ble 5. We have re–estimated regressions without both control variables and
lagged drug offences, which all were insignificant in Table 4 and Table 5. As
can be seen from columns headed by (1), parameters which were significant
before remain almost unchanged. The largest (still small) change takes place
for the coefficient of young men on theft w.a.c. which increases from 0.947
to 1.110.
In columns (2), we have performed estimations without consideration of the
drugs–crime channel. This is interesting for two reasons. First, we are able
to quantify the degree of bias caused by omitting the influence of drugs in
econometric models of crime. Second, there might be some simultaneity bias
stemming from endogenous drug use, when illicit use of narcotics arises as
a consequence of crime, for instance when within growing criminal milieus
drug abuse belongs to the everyday pattern of criminal social interaction.
However, results reveal that omitting drugs from the model has only a minor
impact on the estimation of other effects. A somewhat larger difference
can be detected for the coefficient of foreigners on theft w.a.c. Here, the
influence of foreigners would be erroneously significant when drug offences
were omitted. Since high shares of foreigners and drug offences both are
phenomena of urban and densely populated areas, these variables are highly
correlated in a bivariate regional setting, but not necessarily in any causal
way. Leaving out one of these two variables bears the danger that the other
variable takes over the effect of the neglected factor, which is a property of
the classical omitted variable bias that seems to take place in case of the
share of foreigners. The same upward bias of the estimated foreigner effect
can be observed for all equations of Tables 6 and 7, though only in case of
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theft w.a.c. there is a bias that would lead to a wrong statistical conclusion.
The variable “drug offences” is replaced by the “number of deaths due to
drug poisoning” in Table 8. The sample, too, has changed since the latter
variable is only available since 1984. Drug deaths, the indicator of drug
problems used by Corman and Mocan (2000), in neither case works. One
might suspect that this outcome is an artefact of the different sample period,
but repeating regressions of Table 8 using “log (drug offences)” instead of “log
(drug deaths)” results in coefficients which are almost the same as in Tables 6
and 7, as can be seen from the coefficients on theft u.a.c.: 0.064 (Table 6:
0.052), theft w.a.c.: 0.072 (Table 6: 0.064), robbery: 0.062 (Table 7: 0.093),
and rape: 0.218 (Table 7: 0.205) (estimates not listed elsewhere). With
respect to theft u.a.c., Table 8 confirms the significant roles of deterrence,
unemployment and share of foreigners. The same holds for significant effects
in the equation of theft w.a.c., although here the already high demographic
influence of young men (aged 15 to 24) has increased even more from 0.95
to 1.38 in Table 8 (it reduces to 1.25 when drug offences were used). For
violent crimes, however, besides effects arising via the drugs–crime channel,
no significant result can be detected for the smaller data base of 1984 to
1996 (which also holds if drug offences are included instead of drug deaths).
Thus, once again, this analysis confirms the better performance of economic
property crime models compared to economic models of violent crime.
8 Conclusions and discussion
Drug addiction is a topic of major public concern. This is partially due to
the assumption that there might exist a causal relationship from drug abuse
to increasing crime rates. In fact, a cursory inspection of the problem might
lead to this conclusion. Many surveys indicate that drug users are more
likely to have a connection with the criminal justice system (through arrests
and incarcerations) compared to non–drug users, and criminal justice system
data indicate that a large percentage of arrestees test positive for illicit drug
use at the time of their arrest (see French et al., 2000, for a survey of the
related criminological literature). However, drug use may be, as French et al.
(2000) put it, the “catalyst” for criminal activity, but the interrelationships
between drug use and crime are more complex and require more than a
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two–dimensional view of the drugs–crime nexus. In this paper, this link is
analysed within the Becker–Ehrlich model of crime supply, augmented by
the consideration of currently discussed factors like demographic changes,
unemployment, and income inequality.
Estimation with panel data for 11 German states allows us to assess the im-
portance of the drug abuse crime link, which comprises systemic, economic
and pharmacological effects. According to our estimation results, which ap-
pear to be quite robust with regard to different specifications, a significant
drugs–crime nexus appears to be relevant for several crime categories. This
link has been ignored in most previous applications of the Becker–Ehrlich
framework. Our analysis for the variable “share of foreigners” demonstrates
the potential importance of the resulting omitted variable bias. Nevertheless,
illicit drug use is far from being the only or exclusive driving force behind
the evolvement of crime rates.
The highest impact of drug use is found on rape, a crime category not in-
cluded in the analysis by Corman and Mocan (2000). Further significant
effects are found on property crimes such as robbery and theft. These ef-
fects can be attributed to the economic effect of drug abuse. The overall
performance of the economics of violent crime model is less convincing. Nev-
ertheless, the lack of significance of the drug measure for murder and assault
might be taken as weak evidence against a pronounced systemic effect of
the market of illicit drugs on these crime categories. In spite of a different
measure of the drug problem (we use drug offences and not deaths due to
drug poisoning), different econometric methods (panel econometrics versus
time series analysis) and different observational units (German states versus
New York City), our results are similar to those presented by Corman and
Mocan (2000), underlining the robustness of found results.
We are sceptical, however, with respect to the far–reaching policy implica-
tions made by Corman and Mocan (2000). Based on the comparison of esti-
mated elasticities of robberies, for instance, which are, 0.18 to 0.28 for drug
use and -0.71 to -0.94 for robbery arrests, they conclude that “increased law
enforcement is a more effective methods of crime prevention in comparison
to efforts targeted at drug use”. Without consideration of any cost–benefit
analysis, such suggestions are difficult to justify. They would require cost
estimates of a one percent change of drug offences and arrests or clear–up
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rates on the one hand, and estimation of benefits in terms of reduced costs
of crime, more particularly of murder, assault, theft, robbery, vandalism etc.
on the other. Corman and Mocan (2000) do not use such figures, although
costs of crime are available for the U.S. (see, for instance, Anderson 1999;
unfortunately, no comparable cost of crime estimates can be obtained for
Germany).
Chronic drug users are also victims of crime. This is a neglected aspect when
quantifying the benefits of crime reduction. French et al. (2000) find that,
relative to non–drug users, chronic drug users are 16 percent more likely to
become a victim of crime (and 23 percent more likely to be a perpetrator
of crime, and 25 percent more likely to be either a victim or a perpetrator).
This aspect might also be relevant for the strong impact of drug use on rape
indicated by our estimates.
The most difficult task, however, is to evaluate the benefits of drug prevention
programs, or rehabilitation programs. There is a variety of programs in use,
and not all of them are ineffective. A substantial body of research in the US,
mainly performed by the Department of Health, has found that treatment
programmes can produce marked reductions in illegal drug use and drug
related crime. For instance, the United States’ 1996 National Treatment
Improvement Evaluation Study found that clients reported a decrease of
about 50% in the year following treatment and that arrests had declined
from 48.2% to 17.2% (NACRO 1999). Of course, there are good reasons to be
sceptical about these big successes, and econometricians might suspect some
selectivity problems. However, just for this reason much more evaluative
work needs to be done before strong conclusions like the one given by Corman
and Mocan (2000) can be drawn.
Given the lack of reliable cost–benefit results, besides conventional measures,
which try to increase the clear–up rate, programs aiming at reducing the
economic effect of drug abuse can be considered. However, in order to obtain
sustainable effects, such programs should not contribute to an increase in
rents on the illegal drug market, but rather aim at reducing these rents. The
development of actual proposals to this end remains on our research agenda.
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A Appendix: Results of Sensitivity Analysis
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis I
Independent Theft Theft Theft Theft
Variables u.a.c. u.a.c. w.a.c. w.a.c.
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Deterrence
- log (clear–up rate (-1)) -0.192∗∗ -0.182∗∗ -0.068 -0.023
(0.042) (0.042) (0.092) (0.093)
Drugs
- log (drug offences) 0.052∗ – 0.064∗∗ –
(0.027) (0.021)
Income opportunities
- log (ur(-1)) 0.229∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.023 0.032
(0.068) (0.069) (0.107) (0.056)
- relative income (-1) -0.269 -0.248 -0.139 -0.116
(0.169) (0.174) (0.139) (0.139)
Demographics
- log (share of young men, 15–24) 0.339 0.322 1.110∗∗ 1.105∗∗
(0.250) (0.259) (0.216) (0.212)
- log (share of foreigners) 0.322∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.196 0.230∗
(0.126) (0.130) (0.106) (0.105)
AR(1)–coefficient 0.554∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.590∗∗ 0.571∗∗
(0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
BFN–DW–statistics 2.11 2.14 2.19 2.20
Adjusted R–squared 0.992 0.992 0.987 0.987
All estimates include time– and region–specific constants (two–way fixed–effect
modelling), standard errors in parentheses, sample: West German states, 1976–
1996 (220 observations)
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis II
Independent Robbery Robbery Rape Rape
Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
Deterrence
- log (clear–up rate (-1)) -0.048 -0.084 0.079 0.032
(0.081) (0.081) (0.117) (0.121)
Drugs
- log (drug offences) 0.093∗∗ – 0.205∗∗ –
(0.036) (0.051)
Income opportunities
- log (ur(-1)) -0.064 -0.037 0.085 0.126
(0.105) (0.106) (0.131) (0.139)
- relative income (-1) -1.402∗∗ -1.379∗∗ 0.014 0.127
(0.321) (0.323) (0.327) (0.348)
Demographics
- log (share of young men, 15–24) 0.693 0.746 0.775 0.761
(0.665) (0.653) (0.469) (0.509)
- log (share of foreigners) 0.547∗ 0.626∗∗ 0.058 0.171
(0.250) (0.251) (0.246) (0.262)
AR(1)–coefficient 0.841∗∗ 0.830∗∗ 0.555∗∗ 0.576∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066)
BFN–DW–statistics 2.31 2.30 2.17 2.20
Adjusted R–squared 0.991 0.990 0.946 0.942
All estimates include time– and region–specific constants (two–way fixed–effect
modelling), standard errors in parentheses, sample: West German states, 1976–
1996 (220 observations)
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis III
Independent Theft Theft Robbery Rape
Variables u.a.c. w.a.c.
Deterrence
- log (clear–up rate (-1)) -0.217∗∗ -0.105 0.201 0.082
(0.051) (0.119) (0.261) (0.137)
Drugs
- log (drug death) 0.014 -0.006 0.013 -0.011
(0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.035)
Income opportunities
- log (ur(-1)) 0.283∗∗ 0.081 -0.016 0.118
(0.082) (0.060) (0.092) (0.191)
- relative income (-1) -0.392∗ 0.038 -0.028 0.537
(0.184) (0.132) (0.216) (0.466)
Demographics
- log (share of young men, 15–24) -0.350 1.384∗∗ 0.048 1.224
(0.312) (0.226) (0.380) (0.813)
- log (share of foreigners) 0.371∗ 0.202 0.266 -0.166
(0.160) (0.115) (0.190) (0.410)
AR(1)–coefficient 0.292∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 0.534∗∗
(0.094) (0.094) (0.075) (0.086)
BFN–DW–statistics 1.81 1.85 2.18 2.20
Adjusted R–squared 0.992 0.990 0.984 0.942
All estimates include time– and region–specific constants (two–way fixed–effect
modelling), standard errors in parentheses, sample: West German states, 1984–
1996 (143 observations)
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